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warning required under the latter section. 166 Considering the possible
consequences, a plaintiff who elects to serve a summons without a
complaint would be well advised to speedily comply with the defendant's demand for service.
ARTICLE

32 -

ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3211(d): Court of Appeals adopts liberal approach in allowing
discovery to oppose a motion to dismiss for lack of personaljurisdiction.
At times, a party may seek to oppose a motion to dismiss a cause
of action where "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but
cannot then be stated."'' 67 In such instances, CPLR 3211(d) permits
a court to order a continuance for disclosure of such facts.1 68 This
section has proven to be a particularly useful aid for plaintiffs attempting to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.169 Facts
necessary to show sufficient New York contacts to confer jurisdiction
thereunder are often exclusively within the control of the moving
defendant. Without the aid of disclosure, a plaintiff, though diligent
in his search for existing facts, would face eventual loss of his opportunity to litigate in a New York court.
In Peterson v. Spartan Industries, Inc.,170 the Court of Appeals
considered what burden a plaintiff need overcome to establish that
sufficient facts supporting jurisdiction "may exist." Once having satisfied this burden, a nonresident defendant would be compelled to comply with a discovery and inspection notice.
The claim in Peterson arose when plaintiff was burned in New
166 CPLR 3216(b)(3) states that before an action can be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to CPLR 3216(a), the court or the defendant seeking the dismissal must
serve upon the plaintiff a written demand to resume the prosecution. Thereafter, plaintiff
has 45 days to resume prosecution and file a note of issue. No such requirement applies
to a motion for a CPLR 3012(b) dismissal. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3012, commentary
at 591-92 (1974).
167 CPLR 3211(d) provides:
Should it appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion [to dismiss
a cause of action or defense] that facts essential to justify opposition may exist
but cannot then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving
party to assert the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a
continuance to permit farther affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had
and may make such other order as may be just.
168 Prior to enactment of the CPLR, the courts were in conflict. However, the weight
of authority favored interpreting CPA 307 as not allowing an examination before trial of
a defendant in order to oppose a motion to dismiss. Compare Loonsk Bros., Inc. v. Mednick, 246 App. Div. 464, 285 N.Y.S.2d 801 (4th Dep't 1935) (allowing a preliminary examination), with Standard Foods Prods. Corp. v. Vinas Unidas SA., 200 Misc. 590, 104
N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951) (no authority exists for taking a deposition
of a party for use upon a motion before trial).
169 CPLR 302.
170 33 N.Y.2d 463, 310 N.E.2d 513, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1974).
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York while using a garden torch, the fuel for which was manufactured
by a Connecticut corporation. Jurisdiction was alleged under CPLR
302(a)(1) and (3). In opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff was able to state only such facts
which established the most tenuous contacts with the state, clearly
insufficient in themselves to support jurisdiction. 171 Special Term
referred the jurisdictional issue to a referee. While this issue was
pending before the referee, plaintiff served a notice of discovery and
inspection; defendant countered by moving for a protective order to
vacate the notice. The defendant's motion was denied, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed. 7 2 Two judges dissented in
part, contending that the defendant should not be subjected to the
burden of a detailed hearing until the plaintiff had made out "some
prima facie showing of jurisdiction."'173 Such a showing, they urged,
was particularly essential where the defendant had merely "manufactured a fuel which was intended to, and did, ignite ...."174
In affirming the First Department, the Court of Appeals rejected
the notion that some threshold jurisdiction must first be established 75
The Court held that so long as the allegation of jurisdiction is not
171 The only evidence that plaintiff was able to produce regarding defendant's activities in New York were records of the New York City Fire Department indicating that
defendant had applied to it for approval to store and use its product. While defendant
had been representing to the public that such approval had been obtained, this was not,
in fact, the case. It was also established that permits to conduct such activities had been
issued to defendant some years prior to the incident in question. Id. at 467, 310 N.E.2d at
515, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 908. These facts are dearly insufficient to constitute the transaction
of business within the state to satisfy CPLR 302(a)(1).
Under CPLR 302(a)(3), the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant
committed "a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within
the state" and either (1) has substantial contacts with the state or (2) should reasonably
expect consequences within the state from the tortious act and derives substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce. Satisfaction of these standards was highly
improbable, since it was undisputed that the defendant had made no sales to anyone
in New York for at least two years prior to the accident. Peterson v. Spartan Indus. Inc.,
40 App. Div. 2d 807, 808, 338 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (Ist Dep't 1972) (per curiam).
17240 App. Div. 2d 807, 338 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Ist Dep't 1972) (per curiam).
173 Id. at 809, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
174 Id.
175 33 N.Y.2d 463, 310 N.E.2d 513, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1974).
Previous cases allowed disclosure to oppose a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction although the particular issue of whether the plaintiff must make a prima
fade showing of jurisdiction had not been considered. See Potter Real Estate Co.,
v. 0 & S Bearing & Mfg. Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 883, 302 N.Y.S.2d 178 (4th Dep't 1969)
(mem.); Sucrest Corp. v. Fisher Governor Co., 32 App. Div. 2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 881
(1st Dep't 1969) (per curiam); Propulsion Systems, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 67
Misc. 2d 839, 325 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Gershuny v. Compagnia Italia
Dei Grandi Alberghi, 53 Misc. 2d 653, 279 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1967).
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frivolous, discovery should be allowed to enable the plaintiff to oppose
the motion. The Court realized the essential role discovery often plays
in guiding it to a competent judgment regarding jurisdiction. In
rejecting "prima facie jurisdiction" as the test under CPLR 3211(d),
the Court noted that such a showing would place an unfair burden on
a plaintiff who attempts to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute. In such cases, it felt, the jurisdictional issue is often complex
and the facts may be unobtainable in any other manner. 176
The language of CPLR 3211(d) would seem to support the Court's
liberal attitude in allowing discovery. 177 If facts necessary to oppose a
motion to dismiss "cannot then be stated," it would be impossible for
the plaintiff to make out any prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Even
requiring affirmative proof that they "may exist" would often impose
an impossible burden on the plaintiff and require a judgment involving pure speculation on the part of the Court.
Moreover, the concept underlying the extraterritorial reach of
process is essentially one of "fairness."'378 Certainly, much less proof
would appear necessary to require a defendant to undergo a limited
inquiry into the question of the existence of personal jurisdiction
than to compel him to defend on the merits. It would by no means
seem "unfair" to require a corporation in a neighboring state which
had at one time obtained permission to market and store its products
in New York to undergo such an inquiry. 179 The Court of Appeals,
therefore, allowed the plaintiff every reasonable doubt in determining
whether the allegation of jurisdiction was sufficient to warrant further
inquiry.
176 33 N.Y.2d at 467, 310 N.E2d at 515, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The Court noted that
CPLR 3211(d) was adapted from FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f, which allows a party opposing a

motion for summary judgment to obtain disclosure if he states why he is unable to
present facts essential to justify his opposition. 33 N.Y.2d at 466, 310 NE.2d at 514, 354
N.Y.S.2d at 907. This section has been liberally applied by the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Slagle v. United States, 228 F.2d 673, 678-79 (5th Cir. 1956). The federal courts would
apparently grant disclosure under circumstances similar to those in Peterson. See, e.g.,
Surpitski v. Hughes-Keenan Corp., 362 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1966), wherein the court noted:
"When the fish is identified, and the question is whether it is in the pond, we know
no reason to deny a plaintiff the customary license." Id. at 256.
177 See note 167 supra.
178 [D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
179See note 171 supra.

